Robert Songer, LNG Market Analyst at Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), explains that while much focus from energy companies tracking hostilities between Israel and Iran has been on higher oil, gas and LNG prices, compromises to critical regional shipping data pose risks both to safety and wider data analysis.
According to Songer, the corruption of the automated ship signal (AIS) data that vessels broadcast to alert others of their whereabouts has emerged in recent days, especially in and around the Straits of Hormuz, the narrow channel between Iran and Oman. On Monday 16 June, after a weekend of rocket fire between Iran and Israel, AIS data gathered by ICIS LNG Edge showed significant disruptions coming from several ships close to Ras Laffan, Qatar, in the Persian Gulf.
In the case of LNG tankers, this manifested itself in ‘spoofed’ signals erroneously indicating that several vessels were located on the Iranian mainland.
The level of electronic interference … inside the Gulf [is] having a significant impact on vessels’ positional reporting through automated systems. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and continue to report incidents of electronic interference, the UKMTO said on 16 June.
It has been reporting about GPS interference in the region since early May.
AIS interventions
Faced with these issues, ICIS LNG analysts have been carefully unpicking the satellite trails produced by spoofed LNG shipping to try to work out where they actually are. At the same time as UKMTO was issuing its warning, around six LNG vessels were broadcasting erroneous locations inside the Iranian mainland, at Asaluyeh, more or less opposite Bahrain on the other side of the Persian Gulf. Once identified, it is possible to manually delete the erroneous waypoints and reposition the vessel back where it was last reliably seen.
However, given that each time the vessel broadcasts a new point it can place it back in Iran, ICIS has been generally been carrying out removals only once a vessel is clearly back on the move, as in the case of Maran Gas Troy, a laden vessel which was clearly rounding Hormuz in the evening of 17 June.
Major safety implications
Together with marine radar, the AIS signature that ships broadcast to satellites is a key tool in collision avoidance for water traffic. On 17 June, however, a collision was reported between two vessels 26 nautical miles northeast of Fujairah. Footage later showed one of the vessels, an oil tanker, having sustained severe damage and burning strongly.
There was “no indication the incident was the result of hostile activity resulting from the ongoing regional conflict,” UKMTO added, but the fact that the collision was caused by vessels sailing blind, rather than being hit by a missile is unlikely to calm the market significantly.
This was in evidence in the rollcall of around 12 ballast vessels outside Ras Laffan at the start of the week, apparently waiting to load and move off. It subsequently emerged that QatarEnergy had reportedly instructed its ships to only make transit into the Persian Gulf the day before loading and to wait outside, in the Arabian Sea, until they were ready to do so.
With indications that insurance requirements have been preventing some shippers from entering the area for the time being, there is scope for further disruption, Songer concludes.
